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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to determine the motivational factors leading to voluntary tax compliance with 
specific focus on selected taxpayers under the Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) system in Bayelsa State. Data was 
collected through the administration of structured questionnaire. Analyses were performed using version 19 of E-
VIEW with ordinary least squares regression analysis and the Mann Whiteney U-test. It was found that public 
participation in tax policy formulation has no significant effect on tax compliance; that goal- oriented tax  
policies will lead to an increase in tax compliance and that effective and satisfactory use of tax revenue by 
government will significantly increase the level of tax compliance in Bayelsa State. It was concluded that goal-
oriented tax policies and judicious use of tax revenue are critical factors in taxpayers’ compliance. It is 
recommended that tax policies be tied to specific goals with government providing sufficient evidence of better 
utilization of tax revenue to achieve voluntary tax compliance. 
Keywords: Tax Compliance, Motivation, Tax Administration,  Bayelsa State, Nigeria 
 
Introduction  
Taxation is an age-long practice which could be traced to the days of early civilization. It is viewed as an act of 
recognition of who is in authority, often demonstrated in the payment of tangible tributes either under 
compulsion or by way of duty requirement (Appah, 2010). Such contributions in the early days were not 
monetized. In Nigeria, the contributions required were in farm produce such as yams, cassava, fish, and plantain 
or even by physical labour (Kiabel, 2011). In all forms of it, it was not always a joyous thing to the taxpayers to 
willingly do so without a restrain or by enforcement. This natural unwillingness to comply with tax payment 
accounts for tax avoidance and tax evasion – two of the major means by which leakages occur in the tax system. 
However, drawing from the Expectancy theory of motivation (Tamunomiebi & Zeb-Obipi, 2009), there are 
identifiable attractive rewards if taxes are paid which are capable of satisfying taxpayers’ unsatisfied needs such 
as roads, electricity, water, security etc. In effect, since individuals cannot provide public goods, seeing the 
government doing so could motivate a collective obligation to comply with tax payment (Alm, 2013). Moreover, 
since individuals are motivated not simply by self-interest but also by group notions like social norms, social 
capital, tax morals, they will comply with the social norm of paying taxes so long as government comply  with 
social norms and attaching specific goals to specific taxes and employ Management By Objectives (MBO) 
principles in formulating tax policies (Alm, 2013). 
 
The theory of “economics-of-crime” was first applied to tax compliance by Allinghan & Sandmo (1972). This 
theory sees tax compliance by a single representative individual as maximizing the expected utility of the tax 
evasion gamble, rationally weighing the benefits of successful cheating against the risky prospects of detection 
and punishment and the individual pays taxes because he or she is afraid of getting caught and penalized if he or 
she does not report all income (Alm, 2013). Earlier studies, for example, (Slemrod, 2007; Kleven et al, 2010) 
have shown that an increase in tax rates result to corresponding increase in revenue generated not as a proportion 
to the rate but as a proportion to compliance and that what matters most for tax compliance is enforcement 
(Allinghan & Sandmo, 1972). However, Torgler (2007); Kirchler (2007) and Alm (2013) do not see enforcement  
as the sole panacea for tax compliance arguing that: (i) tax audit is seldom done by most tax authorities and; (ii) 
penalty for non-compliance is  in most instances less than the rate of tax evasion and infrequent. 
 
Arogundade (2005) has equally argued that enforcement is not sufficient on its own to ensure tax compliance. 
According to him, enforcement has to be complemented with taxpayers’ service, which in his views, had not 
received much attention in Nigerian taxation. He suggested that the Nigerian tax administration should design 
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taxpayers’ service which should take the form of taxpayers’ education, clear and cautious communication with 
taxpayer, unimpeded access to the tax authority by taxpayer, transparency in dealing with taxpayer and clear 
channels for complaints. Drawing from the above submissions, it is obvious (in the case of Nigeria) that if fear of 
punishment is a cause for compliance then with the low level of enforcement and punishment of tax offenders 
there would have been practically no payment of tax. 
The Bayelsa State government in Nigeria recently introduced a new tax policy and administration model on 
incomes arising from an employment, a trade, business, profession or vocation. The policy which took effect 
from the 2013 year of assessment compels civil servants and the self-employed in the state to now pay higher tax 
liabilities up to 200 percent of the previous tax liabilities in years before 2013. Interestingly, none of the civil 
labour or trade unions protested. So far, there is a 100 percent compliance by the affected taxpayers. About  the 
same time that the tax policy was introduced, the Bayelsa State government also came out with the 
“Accountability Initiative” whereby the public is kept abreast of how all revenues accruing to the state are 
utilized. The pertinent question which this paper sought to provide an answer was: What factor(s) could have 
probably motivated compliance (by the taxpayers under study). Specifically, the major aim of this paper is to 
determine the reason(s) that may be or are responsible for tax compliance  apart from enforcement and to seek 
ways to employ such means (by government) to achieve tax compliance and greater revenue generation. In more 
specific terms, this paper set out to: 
• Assess the extent to which public participation in tax policy formulation impact on compliance with tax 
payment among individual taxpayers in Bayelsa State; 
• Determine the extent to which a goal-oriented tax system affect tax compliance among individual tax 
payers in Bayelsa State; and  
• Evaluate the extent to which an effective and satisfactory use of tax revenue by government influences 
the level of tax compliance among individual tax payers in Bayelsa State. 
Operationally, the focal research questions were: 
• To what extent does public participation in tax policy formulation affect compliance with tax payment 
by individuals  in Bayelsa State? 
• To what extent does a goal-oriented tax system affect tax compliance by individuals in Bayelsa State? 
and;  
• To what extent does an effective and satisfactory use of tax revenue by government influence the level 
of tax compliance by individuals in Bayelsa State? 
 
Consequently, the following hypotheses, stated in their null form, were tested: 
Ho1: Public participation in tax policy formulation has no significant effect on compliance with tax payment 
among individual tax payers in Bayelsa State. 
 
Ho2: A goal-oriented tax system does not lead to a significant increase in tax compliance among individual 
taxpayers  in Bayelsa State. 
 
Ho3: An effective and satisfactory use of tax revenue by government does not significantly increase the level 
of tax compliance among individual taxpayers in Bayelsa State. 
 
The Literature  
Tax Enforcement and Compliance Measures in Nigerian Taxation  
According to Ogundele (1999), tax compliance is the act of subjecting oneself to the demands of the tax laws 
either voluntarily, by persuasion, inducement or compulsion. “Voluntary tax compliance” occurs when a tax 
payer willingly submits himself as best as he can to the requirements of the tax laws. “Enforced tax compliance”, 
on the other hand, is when he is compelled or coerced to do same. Thus, not all non-compliance are due to 
evasion. As Ogundele (1999) had noted, it is quite conceivable that non-compliance might be driven by simple 
incapacity to comply or even ignorance of what to do. Compliance has been a great problem in the Nigerian tax 
system as a result of the large scale of Nigeria’s informal sector. The administrative burden of applying the tax 
provisions had equally been very cumbersome for some of these entities. 
 
The various enforcement measures under the Nigerian Tax Act  include litigation, exercise of power of search 
and seizure, exercise of power to lay distress, denial of Tax Clearance Certificate (TCC), imposition of penalty 
and interest, authority to the Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF) to deduct un-remitted withholding tax 
from funds due to relevant agencies of government and authority to the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) to refuse 
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clearance to any defaulting shipping company (Arogundade, 2005). By Section 104 of the Personal Income Tax 
Act, 2004 (as amended), the relevant tax authority, may for the purpose of enforcing payment of tax due: “ (a) 
distrain the  taxpayer by his goods, other chattels, bonds or other securities, or (b) distrain upon any land, 
premises or places, in respect of which the taxpayer is the owner... and recover the amount of tax due by sale of 
anything so distrained.” 
 
In addition to the above stated statutory provisions, there are some administrative measures for tax enforcement 
purposes. The most prominent of these is the Special Investigation (compliance) Branch (SIB) which deals with 
suspected cases of tax fraud and serious non-compliance. The offences dealt with include failure to file returns, 
non-disclosure or undeclaration of income, false or incorrect claims and similar offences (Part XIII, CITA). 
 
The police as well as the Office of the Attorney-General (OAG) are also involved in tax enforcement. Other 
criminal tax offences such as conversion or diversion  of drafts or other financial instruments for payment of tax, 
forgery of tax receipts, embezzlement, bribery and corruption and other fraudulent Acts are handled by the 
police or the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) as the case may be (Arogundade, 2005). 
Though, the Act gives the “Board” the powers to sanction any prosecution in respect of fraudulent acts, the final 
authority for the prosecution lies with the OAG. 
 
The degree of voluntary compliance in any tax system is influenced by the effectiveness of enforcement actions 
in place. The institutional arrangements in place to achieve high compliance in the Nigerian tax system include 
tax audit, collection monitoring and the Inspection Units (Arogundade, 2005). Tax audit, which may be desk 
audit or field audit is meant to achieve compliance with the provisions of the tax Act. While desk audit is 
conducted in the various tax offices of the Board (on the desks of the inspectors), field audit is conducted within 
the premises of the taxpayer. The purpose of a tax audit is to verify any matter relating to the profits of the 
taxpayer or any matter relating to entries in any books, documents, accounts or returns. The objective of 
collection monitoring is to ensure compliance by the taxpayers with withholding tax rules and regulations, timely 
remittance of deductions and payment of assessments within the due date of payment. While tax audit and 
collection monitoring are concerned with compliance by taxpayers, the Inspection Unit is concerned with 
compliance by the tax officials with the law and procedure to ensure uniform application of standards. 
 
To achieve voluntary compliance the enforcement and compliance measures and arrangements are 
complemented with taxpayers’ services. Taxpayers’ services should come in  form of public enlightenment, staff 
education, elimination of touting, simplification of the law, guidelines and processes, transparency in application 
of tax measures, evasion detection and punishment for delinquency (Arogundade, 2005; Ogundele, 1999). 
 
Theories of Motivation Related to Taxation and Tax Compliance 
The role of theory in explaining social phenomena cannot be overemphasized. According to Riahi-Belkaoni 
(2000), theories shape meanings and help in the analysis of concepts and their implications. Three theories 
relating to taxation and tax compliance are examined. 
 
 
Goal Setting Theory  
This theory was proposed by Locke (1966); as quoted in Alm, (2013). The premise is that goals tell an employee 
what needs to be done and how much effort will need to be expended (Tamunomiebi & Zeb-Obipi, 2009). A 
specific goal set by an organization will increase performance than easy going goals, and that feedback leads to 
higher performance than non-feedback. Specific hard goals produce a higher level of output than a generalized 
goal. The specificity of a goal itself acts as a stimulant. The implications of this theory are that: (i) organizations 
should promote Management By Objectives (MBO). When management proposes and set specific goals and 
communicates such goals with employee participation at the process of setting the goal, compliance becomes an 
easy task; (ii) four ingredients are common to MBO programmes. These are goal specificity, participative 
decision making, explicit time period and feedback on performance. 
 
The objective of this theory to taxation and compliance is that tax policies should be formulated with social 
participation. Society should know why certain tax policies are to be implemented and allowed to make input 
through referendums by the executive and the legislative arms of Government. 
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In the United States of America, when President Obama presented the bill to Senate for a progressive tax system 
on the rich, Senate intensively deliberated on it and selected wealthy American citizens (such as BilGate) were 
invited. The result was a common agreement to comply. 
 
In the Nigerian case, tax laws are indoor legislative matters (or decrees through military veto), compelling 
compliance with enforcement without society contributing to it. Again, taxes should be tied to specific goals and 
objectives not just a mere source of revenue to the government or a means of diversification of the economy 
(Appah & Oyadonghan, 2011). A good example is the education tax, which is tied to improving the educational 
system through  grants for training and development of infrastructures in Nigerian universities and adequate 
funding for libraries and laboratories (Kiabel & Nwikpasi, 2012). Such provisions will enhance compliance with 
tax payment and reduce tax evasion and avoidance because the social goals are specified rather than the personal 
income tax, company income tax etc all of which their imposition have no specific objective and with high level 
of tax avoidance (Appah, 2010). 
 
 
Social Capital Theory 
According to Alm (2013), “there is abundant evidence that individuals are influenced by the social context in 
which and the process by which decisions are made and that they are motivated not simply by self interest but 
also by group notions like social norms, social capital, social customers, social networks, fairness, trust, 
reciprocity, intrinsic motivation, tax morals as well as by individual notions of guilt, shame, morality, or 
altruism.” He called this social interactions theory as agreed by Essia (2005). Working on the psychology of 
taxation, Kirchler (2007) called this process “a social norm of tax compliance.” 
 
A social norm therefore represents a pattern of behavior that is judged in a similar way by others and that is 
sustained in part by social approval or disapproval. If others behaved according to some socially accepted mode, 
then the individual will behave appropriately; if others do not so behave then the individual will re-sent in kind 
(Alm, 2013). Thus, if government comply with social norms, attaching specific goals to specific taxes and 
employ MBO principles in formulating tax policies then people will comply with the social norm of paying their 
taxes. 
 
 
The Expectancy Theory of Motivation 
The social-political theory of taxation does not promise any benefit on the tax payer. It necessitated tax payment 
as a civic duty or responsibility without expecting a commensurate benefit from the government (Bhatia, 2004; 
Jhingan, 2004; Appah & Oyadonghan, 2011). However, tax payers have a fiduciary relationship with the 
government. This benefit-received theory promoted that while the citizens pay tax, government is to, in turn, 
provide certain social goods and services to the tax payers. Bhatia (2004) pointed out that this theory overlooks 
the use of tax policy for economic growth and stabilization of a nation. Individuals see payment of tax as a 
means of contributing their quota to the cost of providing social goods by government (Appah & Oyadonghan, 
2011). 
The expectancy theory of motivation argues that the strength of a tendency to act depends on the strength of an 
expectation that an act will be followed by a given outcome and on the attractiveness of that outcome to the 
individual (Tamunomiebi & Zeb-Obipi, 2009). Three variables are identified with this theory: (a) 
Attractiveness: The importance that individuals place on the potential outcome or reward that can be achieved 
on the job (such as the unsatisfied needs to be satisfied; (b) Performance – reward linkage: The degree to 
which the individual believes that performance at a particular level will lead to the attainment of a desired 
outcome; (c) Effort-Performance  Linkage: The perceived probability by the individual that exerting a given 
amount of effort will lead to performance. 
 
The principles are that: (i) there are identifiable attractive rewards if taxes are paid which are capable of 
satisfying their unsatisfied needs such as roads, electricity, water for people lacking them; (ii) the government 
can be trusted to be able to use tax payers’ money wisely to satisfy their needs and that evidence exists that the 
government can be trusted. For example, if the Nigerian government removes the subsidy on fuel, can it 
guarantee that the money will be used in building more refineries and hospitals, electricity and good roads? If the 
answer is yes, citizens will be motivated to pay taxes. This can be compared with the developed nations where 
citizens voluntary file for tax payment because they are convinced that benefits in social goods and services are 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.25, 2014 
 
141 
priorities to the government, not to amass primitive wealth as the case with African political neo-colonial 
capitalist. Since individuals cannot provide public goods, seeing the government doing so motivates a collective 
obligation to comply with tax payment by tax payers (Alm, 2013). 
 
Corporations will also comply if seeing that their tax compliance promotes social development and 
environmental peace and security for business to grow and dominate in peace within the environment. This 
situation creates moral individuals towards the payment of tax (Akerlof & Kranton, 2010). 
Table 1 below provides a summary of prior studies in other jurisdictions on tax compliance. 
Table 1: Empirical Review 
Author Year Method Findings 
James 
Alm 2013 
Empirical study with 
experimental method 
Group motivation has direct effect on tax compliance. 
Alm, 
Clark & 
Leibel  
2012 
Secondary data on tax filing 
compliance for Tax year 2000. 
Found that not filing increases with heterogeneity by 
race and decreases by religion and other enforcement 
variables. 
Alm & 
Yunus 2009 
Spatial Dependence with 
secondary data. State lead time 
series with cross sectional data. 
Increase in tax evasion in one state result to a positive 
increase in tax evasion in a neighboring state with a 
response of 10% to 20.4% effect on other states. 
Alm & 
Torgler 2006 
World values survey data on 
wide range of countries over 
several years with 
multivariance analysis. 
Test the role of culture on tax compliance and found a 
significant high tax moral in the United States than in 
Spain. Apart from the US is Austria and Switzerland-
countries with high moral for tax compliance. 
 
Methodology and Model 
The major objective of this paper is to determine the motivational factors leading to voluntary tax compliance 
with specific focus on selected taxpayers under the Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) system in Bayelsa State. Towards 
this end, questionnaire was used for primary data collection. A set of structured questionnaire (see appendix 1) 
was administered by hand (with the assistance of twenty research assistants mainly final year accounting 
students from the Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, Yenagoa) on two hundred respondents. The 
respondents were made up of one hundred taxpayers from the state civil service, fifty from the local government, 
ten from corporate bodies and forty from self-employed taxpayers in the state. Sampling was based on 
convenience. A total of one hundred and sixty copies of the questionnaire were retrieved  between February, 
2013 and May, 21st , 2013. Of this number, one hundred and twenty-one copies only were found usable for the 
purpose of the study. 
 
Respondents were required to indicate their agreement with statements relating to certain factors hypothesized to 
motivate voluntary tax compliance on a 5-point numerical rating scale using verbal labels from end-points 
strongly agree/strongly disagree. The questionnaire was subjected to validity and reliability tests. Validity is the 
ability of a research instrument to measure what it is purported to measure (Cooper & Schindler, 2001). Content 
validity was enhanced through the combined processes of logical validation and expert opinion. Towards this 
end, the questionnaire was pretested on taxation experts with extensive professional backgrounds and industry 
consulting practices. The reliability of the instrument used was assessed through test re-test analysis using 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient. The result with α–test 0.095 is less than the 0.15% standard value which 
confirms the instrument’s consistency. As stated by Mayer (1972), the “reliability of a questionnaire refers to the 
consistency of responses that it elicits”. 
 
The results from the instrument were analysed using version 19 of Econometric View (E-VIEW) with ordinary 
least square regression analysis. To determine the significance of the relationship of the three tests conducted, 
Mann-Whiteney U-test was used. These models were considered appropriate for ordinal measurement (Grupta & 
Grupta, 2011; Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
 
Model Specification 
The ordinary least square was guided by the following linear model: 
Y = f(x) -----------------------------(1) 
Where x is for the regressors and Y for the regressants. 
The regressant is tax compliance (Tax) 
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The regressors are: social participation (SOPA), Goal-oriented tax policies (goal) and public satisfaction with 
government use of tax revenue (satist). 
Hence: 
 Tax = f(x1, x2, x3) ----------------------------(2) 
Where x1 = Societal participation (SOPA) 
 x2 = goal oriented tax policies (goal) 
 x3 = public satisfaction of government preference (Satist) 
Tax = a + βSOPA + βGoal + βsatist + e ---------------(3) 
The a priori expectation of the linear model is: 
∂SOPA/∂Tax > 0; ∂Goal/∂Tax; > 0; ∂satist/Tax > 0 
a is the intercept of the regression and e is the error term capturing other explanatory variables not included in 
the linear model. 
 
Analyses, Results and Discussion 
Table 2:  Regression analysis of variables 
Dependent Variable: TAX 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 06/25/13    Time: 17:22 
Sample: 116 
Included observations: 121 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 
SOPA 
GOAL 
SATIS 
6.154906 
-0.135032 
0.347626 
0.347272 
26.06844 
0.1348377 
0.124311 
0.099648 
0.236106 
-1.001452 
2.796424 
3.484993 
0.8173 
0.3364 
0.0162 
0.0045 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
0.603691 
0.504613 
10.82085 
1405.090 
-58.50516 
2.441970 
Mean dependent var. 
S.D. dependent var 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
72.68750 
15.37409 
7.813145 
8.006292 
6.093122 
0.009227 
Source: E-View result with primary data generated by the researchers, 2013. 
The result in table 2 above shows that a 1% increase in the societal participation in the formulation of tax 
policies (SOPA) will result to a -0.135032 decrease in tax compliance by tax payers (TAX) in Bayelsa State. 
With a t-statistic of -1.001452, which is less than the t-critical value of 1.96, the null hypothesis that social 
participation in tax policy formulation has no significant effect on tax compliance is accepted at a probability of 
0.3364. 
 
Again, the tying of tax policies  with specific goals (GOAL) will increase tax compliance with 0.347%, if the 
practice is increased by 1%. With a t-Statistic of 2.7964 which is greater than the t-critical value of 1.96, the null 
hypothesis is rejected and the alternative is accepted at 0.0162 probability which is less than 0.5%. Thus, a goal 
oriented tax system leads to an increase in tax compliance among individual tax payers in Bayelsa state. 
 
Also a 1% increase in the satisfaction of tax payers with the use of tax revenue (SATIS) will lead to a 0.347% 
increase in tax compliance by individual tax payers in Bayelsa State of Nigeria. With the t-Statistic of 3.484 
which is greater than the critical value of 1.96, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative is accepted, 
providing that effective and satisfactory use of tax revenue by  governments will significantly increase the level 
of tax compliance among individual tax payers in Bayelsa State of Nigeria with a probability of 0.0045. 
 
The probability of F-statistics is 0.009227, indicating the overall fitness of the variables in the research model. 
With the Durbin-Watson test of 2.4419, there is no evidence of existence of positive first order auto correlation 
in the model. This indicates that the result from this model can be used for long-term forecasting.  
 
Finally, the R2 of 0.60 and the adjusted R2 of 0.50 means that the variables, SOPA, GOAL, and SATIS explain at 
least 50% of the behavior of individual taxpayers towards tax compliance in Bayelsa State of Nigeria. 
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Table 3: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 06/25/13        Time: 17:26 
Sample: 1   16 
Lags: 2 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability  
SOPA does not Granger Cause TAX 
TAX does not Granger Cause SOPA 
121 4.41589 
0.05842 
0.04610 
0.94361 
GOAL does not Granger Cause TAX 
TAX does not Granger Cause GOAL 
121 1.96425 
0.17060 
0.19594 
0.84582 
SATIS does not Granger Cause TAX 
TAX does not Granger Cause SATIS 
121 0.33028 
0.35805 
0.72708 
0.70856 
GOAL does not Granger Cause SOPA 
SOPA does not Granger Cause GOAL 
121 0.82232 
0.73478 
0.46989 
0.50631 
SATIS does not Granger Cause SOPA 
SOPA does not Granger Cause SATIS 
121 0.61528 
0.36788 
0.56175 
0.70214 
SATIS does not Granger Cause GOAL 
GOAL does not Granger Cause SATIS 
121 1.20989 
0.46269 
0.34248 
0.64377 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
   TAX SOPA GOAL SATIS 
Mean  
Median  
Maximum  
Minimum 
Std. Dev. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
72.68750 
72.50000 
92.00000 
35.00000 
15.37409 
-0.727564 
3.216824 
142.5625 
144.5000 
173.0000 
102.0000 
21.23509 
-0.533393 
2.327578 
142.2500 
150.0000 
173.0000 
96.00000 
23.15599 
-0.967753 
2.856491 
104.6250 
103.5000 
161.0000 
66.00000 
28.19427 
0.421611 
2.567720 
Jarque-Bera 
Probability 
1.442941 
0.486037 
1.060122 
0.588569 
2.511184 
0.284907 
0.598593 
0.741339 
Observations  121 121 121 121 
From table 4 above, the skewness is less than 0 and the Kurtosis is approximately 3 indicating the variables are 
not perfectly normally distributed in the model. 
 
Table 5. ARCH Test: 
F-statistic 
Obs*R-squared 
0.974783 
0.983183 
Probability  
Probability  
0.325510 
0.321414 
 
Table 5 above presents arch serial correlation LM test. The result indicated that there is correlation with 
probabilities of 0.325510 and 0.321414 which is greater than the critical value. 
 
Table 6. White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 
Obs*R-squared 
2.360546 
13.37167 
Probability  
Probability  
0.034687 
0.037499 
 
The result indicate that there is heteroskedasticity with probability of 0.034 which is less than 0.05. 
 
 
 
Table 7. Ramsey RESET Test: 
F-statistic 
Obs*R-squared 
1.024233 
4.309326 
Probability  
Probability  
0.397978 
0.365759 
 
The table above presents the Ramsey reset test for model specification, the result indicate that the model is well 
specified with probabilities of 0.397978 and 0.365759 both greater than 0.05 critical value. 
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Table 8. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
 
F-statistic 
Obs*R-squared 
3.314385 
6.594502 
Probability  
Probability  
0.39860 
0.36985 
 
Table 8 above indicate that there is no serial correlation at probabilities of 0.39860 and 0.36985 both greater than 
0.05 critical value. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The study provided a clear picture of the effect of variables such as public participation in the process of tax 
policy formulation; formulation of goal-oriented tax policies  and the satisfactory use of tax revenue by 
government on tax compliance. With the geometric increase in sources of government expenditure against the 
arithmetical increase in government revenue, every government is encouraged to source for better means of 
revenue generation such as taxation by considering the above factors seriously. That the state government 
succeeded in its tax law implementation in February, 2013 was because  the  policies were tied to specific goals 
and a promise of better utilization of tax revenue with evidence sufficient for the conviction of the tax payers. 
 
On the basis of the findings, the paper recommends in addition to existing enforcement measures  that: 
 
 Taxes should be tied to specific goals and objectives, notwithstanding the fact that tax revenues may  be 
applied by the government depending upon its policy and priorities at a given time. The huge success 
recorded so far with the Federal Government Education Tax (tied to improving the educational system 
in Nigeria) is also a good case  in point. The practice should be sustained in Bayelsa State to assure  
continued tax compliance among individual tax payers. 
 The “Accountability initiative” held monthly by the present administration in Bayelsa State to explain 
to the public how all revenues accruing to the state are utilized by government should be sustained. 
This, in part, explains the virtual wholesale compliance with the new tax policy in the state as the 
citizens are now made aware of how taxes paid by them are utilized. 
 
Further studies should be carried out on the study variables of this paper in other states or country to provide a 
literature for comparative analysis. 
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APPE NDIX 1  Sample Copy of Survey Questionnaire 
Dear Respondent, 
   
Presented before you is a set of statements regarding the factors that motivate taxpayers to 
comply with tax payment. You are expected to objectively respond by a tick ( ) on the options 
provided below:  D = Disagree; A = Agree; U = Undecided; SD = Strongly disagree; SA = 
Strongly agree. 
 
S/No Statements D A U SD SA 
A. SOCIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE 
FORMULATION OF TAX POLICIES AND 
COMPLIANCE 
     
1. Tax policies should be jointly formulated by the 
government and the civil society. 
     
2. Public participation will improve compliance with tax 
payment. 
     
3. Public participation will reduce tax avoidance.      
4. Public participation will reduce tax evasion.      
B. GOAL-ORIENTED TAX POLICIES AND 
COMPLIANCE 
     
1. Tax policies should be tied with specific development 
goals. 
     
2. Goal-oriented tax policies enjoys social acceptance.      
3. Social capital formation tax policies are always 
favourably accepted by tax payers. 
     
4. Specific taxes linked to specific development projects 
enjoys absolute tax compliance. 
     
C SATISFACTORY USE OF REVENUE GENERATED 
FROM TAX AND COMPLIANCE 
     
1. Tax revenue is expected to be used wisely by the 
government. 
     
2. If tax revenues are used to the satisfaction of the masses, 
compliance with tax payment will improve.  
     
3. Tax revenue is used wisely by the present government.      
4. Misuse of tax payers’ money by government encourages 
tax   avoidance and evasion. 
     
D COMPLIANCE WITH TAX PAYMENT IN 
BAYELSA STATE 
     
1. Personal Income Taxpayers in Bayelsa State comply with 
tax payments. 
     
2. The compliance is informed by goal-oriented tax policies.      
3. Tax payers’ compliance in the state is informed by public 
participation in the formulation of tax policies. 
     
4. Tax payers’ compliance is informed by wise use of tax 
money by the government. 
     
 
 
